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Genetic
Information9
Privacy and
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Edward J. Janger
B iobanks hold out the prospect of significant pub-lic and private benefit, as genetic informationcontained in tissue samples is mined for infor-
mation. However, the storing of human tissue samples
and genetic information for research and/or therapeu-
tic purposes raises a number of serious privacy and
autonomy concerns., These concerns are compounded
when one considers the possibility that a biobank or
its owner might go bankrupt.2 Insolvency impairs the
ability of enforcement regimes, and liability-based
regimes in particular, to enforce legal norms.3 The goal
of this essay is to develop guideposts for thinking about
private and public enforcement of privacy imposed by
donors on tissue samples and/or genetic information
when a biobank becomes insolvent.
As with any form of nonpublic, personally identifiable
information, the use of human tissues for purposes
other than those for which they were donated ("sec-
ondary use") raises important substantive policy issues.
When I consent to medical treatment, do I consent to
have my blood used in a research study? Is this consent
limited to the doctors at the hospital where I am
treated? What about private pharmaceutical compa-
nies, attempting to develop drug treatments? If I do
consent to such secondary use, do I waive any rights to
share in the financial benefits earned by any therapy de-
veloped using my tissue? If my consent was procured
hastily on the eve of emergency surgery, and as a pre-
condition to that surgery, should any such consent be
viewed as binding?4 These concerns can be respectively
categorized as (1) scope of consent (what did I agree
to?), (2) permissible secondary use (what uses of my tis-
sue are permissible even though I did not expressly
consent to them?), and adhesion (was my consent
meaningful and voluntary?). Unavoidably, these sub-
stantive concerns will inform this article, but they are
not its focus: The focus of this essay is on remedies, and
specifically how best to enforce limitations on sec-
ondary use when a biobank becomes insolvent. The
key, I argue, is to tie the use restrictions directly to the
information (or sample) itself, rather than focusing, as
most regulation does, on the act of transferring infor-
mation.
This article proceeds in three steps. Part I describes
a typology of remedies for privacy violations that de-
pends on whether rights are enforced through a prop-
erty based regime, a liability based regime or a regime
of public enforcement. Part II explains how the choice
of enforcement regime affects the level of protection ac-
corded a privacy entitlement when a biobank becomes
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The storing of human tissue samples and
information for research and/or therapeu
purposes raises a number of serious priva
and autonomy concerns. These concerns
compounded when one considers the pos
that a biobank or its owner might go ban
insolvent. Liability based protection focuses on the act
of transfer and gives the least protection in bankruptcy.
Property based protection focuses on the item itself,
and provides substantially more. 5 Public enforcement
regimes are unaffected by bankruptcy, but the level of
protection is indeterminate, depending on how prose-
cutorial resources are allocated, and on whether re-
strictions on tissue or information use "run with the
sample:' Part III explores the problems for biobanking
that may be created by a purely property based regime.
While property based protection provides the greatest
protection for donor autonomy, the property right cre-
ated should not be freely and completely alienable, nor
should it be absolute. Adhesion, bounded rationality,
and information asymmetry have the potential to ren-
der even property-based protection no protection at
all.6 At the same time, absolute protection of genetic
privacy has the potential to destroy the common bene-
fits obtained through the aggregation of data.7 This ar-
ticle concludes by suggesting a collective mechanism for
empowering bankruptcy courts to use a cy pres ap-
proach rooted in the bankruptcy concept of "adequate
protection" to balance privacy protections with research
and therapeutic imperatives.
The Question
To facilitate discussion, a concrete fact pattern might be
helpful. Imagine that Paul Patient goes to the doctor for
a cancer treatment. Dave Doctor asks Patient if he will
agree to provide a blood sample for a biobank
("Biobank") that his hospital is building to help study
genetic link factors in cancer, and perhaps develop a
new treatment. Patient agrees, authorizing Biobank to
use his blood sample and related information for "re-
search devoted to identifying the role of genetics in
cancer and to develop new therapies:' For two years, the
project runs along as expected, making some important
advances.
Then Doctor's hospital finds itself in financial diffi-
culty. A private pharmaceutical company, called Gen-
screen, offers the hospital (and Doctor's project) a sig-
nificant amount of money for access to the blood
samples collected by Doctor, and for access to the in-
formation (excluding names) about those samples in
Doctor's database. Instead of using the samples to iden-
genetic tify cancer risks and develop treatment,
[tic Genscreen intends to develop a cheapscreening device which will identify ge-
cy netic risk of cancer and allow insurance
are companies to exclude people with high
sibility risk from coverage. This is not the pur-
pose for which Donor donated his blood,
krupt. nor is it a use for which he gave consent,
nor would he give consent if asked. What
happens if the Biobank goes bankrupt? Can it sell sam-
ples to Genscreen in violation of its promises to Pa-
tient? Does Patient have a breach of contract claim?
What happens to Patient's breach of contract claim in
bankruptcy? Should the answer to these questions
change if the purchaser of the data is seeking to develop
a cure for heart disease?
Property, Liability and Public Enforcement:
Outside of Bankruptcy
Outside of bankruptcy, the status of Patient's claim re-
ceives different levels of protection depending on how
Patient's rights are characterized. They may be pro-
tected, to use Calabresi and Melamed's dichotomy, by
a "property" rule, a "liability" rule, or to reach beyond
the Calabresian terminology, by public enforcement
(which may in turn be civil or criminal).8 Calabresi and
Melamed draw the line between property and liability
based on whether an obligor such as Biobank can
choose to breach its obligation and pay damages - a li-
ability rule, or the obligation will be enforced by an af-
firmative order, and enforced by contempt, punitive
damages, or criminal sanction - a property rule.9 Oth-
ers have focused on whether the right binds specific
people, or whether the entitlement runs with an object,
or bundle of entitlements.1° As Hansmann and Kraak-
man put it:
For our purposes, the attribute that distinguishes a
property right from a contract right is that a prop-
erty right is enforceable, not just against the origi-
nal grantor of the right, but also against other per-
sons to whom possession of the asset, or other
rights in the asset, are subsequently transferred."
These two definitions are not necessarily inconsistent.
However, the focus is different. Under the Calabresian
approach to property, the focus is on the ability of the
rights holder to unilaterally veto any transfer. Under the
Hansmann and Kraakman approach, the focus is not
on veto, but on whether any subsequent taker of the
"property" takes subject to the rights of the initial trans-
feror.
The question of public versus private enforcement, by
contrast, goes to standing, rather than the nature of
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the remedy per se. Entitlements may be enforceable
through both public and private right of action, or they
may be enforceable only privately, or only by public of-
ficials. Public enforcement may be property-like, in that
violation is criminal, or enforced through high fines or
statutory damages, or the relief can be liability-like,
compensatory in nature, and tied to actual damage
caused. The difference between public enforcement
and private enforcement is that a party driven system
is traded for, or supplemented by, a regime of prosecu-
torial discretion.
Figure I
How does the law protect promises not to share in-
formation with companies like Genscreen? To the ex-
tent that they are based in contract, the focus is on
Biobank's promise to Patient. The general rule is that
Patient's rights are only against Biobank, and are pro-
tected only by a liability rule. Patient's rights can only
be asserted against the contracting party. Patient's
rights do not inhere in the information or the sample
itself. The principal remedy for contractual violations
is compensatory damages.12 While specific performance
of the promise through injunctive relief may be avail-
able, such relief is considered extraordinary,'3 and, as
discussed below, is of limited use in bankruptcy.14 While
federal copyright and patent law give the status of prop-
erty to certain forms of intellectual property, the same
is not true for personal information, or for non-disclo-
sure promises. The promise not to disclose, except for
the purposes consented to, does not carry with it a veto
right, or a right that runs with the Paul Patient's blood
sample.15
Contract law is not the only source of protection,
however. There are a number of federal statutes that
might enhance privacy protection through public en-
forcement. For example, Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act (FTC) protects against deceptive trade
practices.16 The FTC has acted to enforce privacy prom-
ises under Section 5,17 and they would likely be troubled
by sale of tissue in a biobank in violation of a promise
not to do so. States also have their own deceptive trade
practices acts, some of which provide for private rights
of action, which may give rise to a right to an injunc-
tion.Is The recently promulgated Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) regulations
also place limit on disclosure of personal information
without consent.19 Neither the FTC Act, nor the HIPAA
regulations provide for a private right of action. Thus,
enforcement is subject to prosecutorial discretion and
is not party driven.
Finally, about 25 states have enacted statutes which
give some form of protection to the privacy of genetic
information. The various approaches reflect little con-
sistency. Some give genetic information express status
as property. Others give property-like protection, in
that they prohibit use of genetic information without
consent, regardless of how the information was ob-
tained. Others give only liability based protection. Some
provide only for public enforcement, some allow a pri-
vate right of action. A table is set forth in the Appendix
to this article. Manyjurisdictions, however, say nothing,
and offer no specific protection beyond state common
law, and the federal overlays described above.
Property, Liability and Public Enforcement
in Bankruptcy
The distinction between property, liability, and public
enforcement is important outside of bankruptcy. The
importance is even greater when a debtor becomes in-
solvent. Property rights are generally respected in bank-
ruptcy, while liability based claims are generally dis-
charged, and paid, if at all, in cents on the dollar.
Treatment of Contract (Liability-based) Claims
in Bankruptcy
Both inside and outside of bankruptcy, the insolvency
of a debtor undercuts the effectiveness of a liability-
based regime. Outside of bankruptcy, this is manifested
through the so-called "judgment proof" problem. A
debtor who is going to be unable to pay a damage judg-
ment may have less compunction about invading the
rights of others.20
Imagine, for example, that, in an effort to stave off
bankruptcy, Biobank sells Patient's information to Gen-
screen. Assume that this is a breach of contract, and
would give rise to liability. One problem common to pri-
vacy contexts is that the damages for such a disclosure
are difficult to calculate. Even assuming, however, that
Patient could prove damages of, say, $1,000, his recov-
ery will be significantly less than that.
If Biobank or its owner files for bankruptcy, a num-
ber of aspects of bankruptcy law undercut the enforce-
ment of promises like that of Biobank to Patient. First,
when a debtor files for bankruptcy, an automatic stay
goes into effect which prohibits any action to collect on
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or enforce a prepetition obligation.21 At the conclusion to grant Patient a "property interest" in personal infor-
of the bankruptcy case, those obligations are dis- mation. Those states are: Colorado, Florida, Georgia
charged.22 Second, while Patient would be free to and Louisiana. The nature of the property right in each
assert a claim for breach of contract in
Biobank's bankruptcy case, damages By contr
would be treated as general unsecured genetic i
claims, and paid pro rata with other such
claims, likely in cents on the dollar.23 For better tr
example, if Biobank has outstanding of the de
unsecured claims of $100,000, and property
unencumbered assets of $15,000, then
Patient's recovery will only be fifteen as havin
cents on the dollar, or $150. Biobank will
not have fully internalized the harm caused by its acts.
Indeed, if the only safeguard against disclosure of in-
formation is a contract claim, this same principle of
discharge and pro rata distribution may allow Biobank
to sell Patient's information post-bankruptcy, in the in-
terest of maximizing the value of its assets for the ben-
efit of its creditors. Similarly, if Biobank's promise of
confidentiality is treated as an executory contract,
Biobank will likely have the power to "reject" or breach
the promise post-petition and have Patient's claim
treated as "prepetition,' and dischargeable.24 Even if
the contract is entitled to specific enforcement outside
of bankruptcy, the trustee's strong-arm power may
render that property-like protection "avoidable" and
unenforceable against creditors.25 If the contract is
viewed as non-executory, then rejection may not even
be necessary.26
Property
By contrast, if Patient is viewed as "owning" his genetic
information, then Patient will receive better treatment
in bankruptcy. If an obligation of the debtor is secured
by an interest in specific property of the debtor, the
creditor will be treated as having a "secured claim."27 Se-
cured status confers on the creditor a number of bene-
fits. First, in any distribution, the secured creditor is en-
titled to receive payment of the value of his or her
collateral .2 More generally, if property of the debtor is
encumbered by an interest that would be enforceable
against third parties outside of bankruptcy, subject to
certain specific avoiding powers, discussed below, that
encumbrance will be respected. Finally, and most im-
portantly, there are restrictions on the debtor's ability
to sell the property free of the non-debtor's property
interest.29
Unlike patent, copyright, or other forms of intellec-
tual property, there is no federal statute giving personal
information the status of property. In the absence of a
special statute conferring such a right, Patient will not
have the status of an owner, entitled to adequate pro-
tection. Four states have enacted statutes that purport
ast, if Patient is viewed as "owning" his
nformation, then Patient will receive
eatment in bankruptcy. If an obligation
btor is secured by an interest in specific
of the debtor, the creditor will be treated
Y a "secured claim:'
state is different. In none of them, however, is the "prop-
erty" right one that would entitle Patient to preferred
treatment in bankruptcy.
For example, in Georgia, while legislative findings
characterize genetic information as "property" they only
provide a remedy in the event that an insurer misuses
the information. The statute does not provide a right of
action in the event that Biobank itself misuses the in-
formation. Louisiana, by contrast, gives some meaning
to the concept of "property," by saying that storing ge-
netic information without authorization will give rise
to liability and in some cases treble damages. However,
even these statutes which purport to create a property
right don't necessarily give Patient rights beyond
damages.
Even if Patient is given a property interest in tissue
samples and/or genetic information, the power of the
debtor to sell assets free and clear of liens and inter-
ests under 363(f) may pose some risk. Section 363(f)
provides:
(f) The trustee may sell property under subsection (b)
or (c) of this section free and clear of any interest in
such property of an entity other than the estate, only
if:
(1) applicable nonbankruptcy law permits sale
of such property free and clear of such interest;
(2) such entity consents;
(3) such interest is a lien and the price at which
such property is to be sold is greater than the
aggregate value of all liens on such property;
(4) such interest is in bona fide dispute; or
(5) such entity could be compelled, in a legal
or equitable proceeding, to accept a money
satisfaction of such interest.30
Thus, in bankruptcy, a debtor has the ability to sell free
and clear of liens and interests, so long as any one of the
five criteria listed in 363(f) is satisfied, and the interest
holder is provided with adequate protection of its in-
terest under section 363(e). Thus, whether section
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363(f) will permit sale of tissue samples or genetic in-
formation free and clear of a promise not to do so will
depend on the nature of the protection given to that
right outside of bankruptcy. If a liability rule is used
(f)(1) will apply. Even if the protection is in the nature
of a lien, or a statutory fine, then (f)(3) or (f)(5) might
apply. If the lien or interest can be stripped off, the in-
terest holder is still entitled to adequate
protection of that interest.31 However, the A regim
nature of that protection will again turn they can
on the nature of the underlying interest.
Under current law, the status is uncertain mitigate
at best. bankruf
The general rule is that debtors cannot
sell property out from under restrictive covenants or
other property interests that are not in the nature of a
lien. For example, in Gouveia v. Tazbir 2 a debtor was
unable to sell real property free and clear of restrictive
covenants contained in the debtor's deed. However,
bankruptcy courts, when considering whether to allow
an asset to be sold free of an encumbrance must weigh
the impact of prohibiting the sale on the bankruptcy
case as a whole. Recent cases manifest this tension. In
a recent ninth Circuit case, In re Rodeo Canyon Devel-
opment Corporation,33 the Ninth Circuit held that a
bankruptcy court could not sell property free and clear
of interests until it had first adjudicated the status of the
asserted ownership interest. By contrast, in In re Trans
WorldAirlines, the Third Circuit held that where TWA
was selling all of its assets to American Airlines, that
sale could be accomplished free and clear of certain
successor liability claims, on the theory that those
claims could be reduced to a money judgment. 34 And,
in Precision Industries v. Qualitech Steel,35 the Seventh
Circuit held that property encumbered by a lease could
be sold free and clear of that lease, even where other
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code would have pre-
vented such sale (if the lessee had objected at the time).
Where the assets of an entire business are being sold,
and the package has value which exceeds those of its
individual parts, courts have shown a willingness
to stretch the limits of section 363(f) to get the job
done.36 While adequate protection is still available
under section 363(e), it is difficult to figure out how to
give meaning to that term where genetic privacy is
concerned.
In Personam v. In Rem
Figuring out how and when to permit transfer of tissue
samples and genetic information free of Patient's con-
sent is the key question posed by bankruptcy. The key
incident of "property" that can mitigate the effect of
bankruptcy on privacy is to focus on the "in rem" nature
of property rights. Calabresi and Melamed focus on the
distinction between rights enforceable through dam-
ages and rights enforceable by affirmative order. As
noted above, Hansmann and Kraakman focus instead
on rights that run with the property. Here, the
Louisiana statute is illustrative. It contains a restriction
on "onward transfer." It is notjust Biobank's transfer of
Patient's genetic information to Genscreen that vio-
e which subjects users to liability unless
demonstrate consent of the donor
s the harm caused to donors by the
itcy of a biobank.
lates the statute. Any storage or use of the information
without Patient's consent would subject Genscreen to
liability. In short, a regime which subjects users to lia-
bility unless they can demonstrate consent of the donor
mitigates the harm caused to donors by the bankruptcy
of a biobank.
Under current law, however, the focus of state law
regulating transfer and use of genetic information
seems calculated to maximize the effect of bankruptcy
rather than to minimize it. As noted above, only four
states characterize the privacy entitlement as property.
To the extent that other states have passed statutes safe-
guarding genetic privacy, 25 states prohibit unautho-
rized transfer of information. Only 11 prohibit genetic
testing without consent, 5 prohibit accessing genetic in-
formation without consent, and 6 prohibit retaining
genetic information without consent. Thus, the most
common form of regulation focuses on unauthorized
transfer of genetic information. This is an important
protection, but because it focuses on the transferor,
rather than the user of the information, the effect is in
personam rather than in rem, and the insolvency of the
transferor is likely to limit the effect of such regulation.
Regulations that prohibit access, use or storage of in-
formation without consent reach beyond the single in-
solvent transferor, and deprive the information (unac-
companied by consent) of its value.
Public Enforcement
Bankruptcy has somewhat less serious impact on rights
that are protected by public enforcement. The auto-
matic stay in bankruptcy contains an exception for both
criminal prosecutions, and litigation aimed at protect-
ing "public safety."3 7 To give one example, a company
known as Toysmart sought to sell customer lists in
bankruptcy after promising prior to bankruptcy not to
do so. The FTC sought to enjoin the sale under Section
5 of the FTC Act, and obtained an injunction. The ac-
tion by the FTC was not stayed, and the sale was
blocked. State and federal statutory schemes that pro-
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vide for public enforcement and injunctive relief as part
of the remedial scheme are not affected by the bank-
ruptcy of a biobank.
Public enforcement is not a panacea, however. Where
the disclosure happens before the enforcement action
can be brought, insolvency will still limit the impact of
enforcement where the remedies are limited to mone-
tary damages or fines. Such fines Ahile assertable in the
bankruptcy, may be subject to subordination, to the ex-
tent that they are non-compensatory, and even if not
subordinated will be payable in cents on the dollar.38
Perhaps more important, however, than the right to
public enforcement per se is the ability to enforce
Biobank's privacy obligations on subsequent holders of
Patient's information.
II.
As discussed above, the principal effect of bankruptcy
on a regime seeking to protect the privacy of personal
information in biobanks is to limit the effectiveness of
monetary remedies as a disincentive to disclosure. This
presents a problem under current law. While a number
of federal statutes provide for public enforcement of ge-
netic privacy and a number of states have statutes that
create private rights of action, the default is that the
protection of genetic privacy lies in contract, and con-
tract rights are enforced through liability rules.
There are two remedies for this problem. Both reme-
dies involve giving genetic information the attributes of
property. The first might be to give the donor of genetic
information a right in the nature of a lien, which would
be entitled to adequate protection. This would provide
some protection to the information insofar as it was
being used by the debtor in bankruptcy, and it would re-
quire compensation if the information was sold. But
liens are generally satisfied by selling the property sub-
ject to the lien, and by paying the proceeds to the lien-
holder. Where the harm caused by disclosure of genetic
information is principally dignitary, and where the
value of a particular tissue sample is relatively small,
this protection may be little better than a liability rule.
Second, we might follow the lead of Louisiana and pro-
hibit any use of the information without authorization.
In other words, genetic information would be treated as
another form of intellectual property, where any use
must be pursuant to a license from the creator/donor.
If protection of Patient's privacy is the goal of the
statute, then an essential attribute of any property
regime is that Patient's conditions on the use of his in-
formation run with the information itself.
However, while minimizing the effect of bankruptcy
on privacy protections is a laudable goal where genetic
information is involved, there are problems with a pure
property regime that need to be addressed. These prob-
lems fall into two broad categories: (1) market im-
perfections and (2) coordination problems. The first
leads to the underprotection of privacy in a simple
property regime, and the second focuses on inefficien-
cies and welfare loss caused by overprotection of prop-
erty rights in a simple property regime. I will discuss
these in order.
First, one concern about a simple property regime
goes to the quality of the consent. How was it obtained?
Was it fully voluntary? This issue looms large in the
medical literature on informed consent.39 Concerns
about adhesion, information asymmetry, and bounded
rationality also play a role in the privacy debate.40 One
can imagine Patient in the above scenario granting
blanket consent to use of his DNA in a number of ways
that would raise concerns. First, cognition and infor-
mation asymmetry can cast doubt on the validity of
consent. The consent to use of the genetic material for
research purposes may have been obtained as part of
consent to treatment. The two may have been contained
on the same form, and Patient may not have even real-
ized that he/she was giving the doctors a right to make
secondary use of genetic information. Further, adhesion
plays a role here too. Sometimes agreement to partici-
pate in a study is the only way that a Patient can obtain
access to a particular treatment. Where treatment and
information sharing are linked as a take it or leave it
proposition, Patient has no choice but to consent.
Where this is the case, the best property protection
will not help.41 Property based protection is worthless
without some legal efforts to police bargains, and/or
create spheres of inalienability, where even blanket con-
sents are interpreted as having certain limits.
Second, property can be overprotective of privacy.42
Banking of genetic information for public purposes can
produce important social benefits. There are perfectly
good public health reasons for invading a person's
privacy in the interest of identifying and/or curing
diseases. The identity of Patient need not necessarily
be revealed to the researcher, but certain medical in-
formation might be important. A strict property
regime, limiting any use of information without con-
sent, might deprive society of these important benefits.
This problem has been described as an anticommons. 43
Where property rights are fragmented, and any stake-
holder has the ability to veto the use of common prop-
erty, coordination problem may result in the destruc-
tion of, or underuse of the common asset. Biobanks are
such common assets. The value of genetic data lies not
in the information about the individual alone, but in the
ability to aggregate data about many people and to note
trends and patterns. If an individual, or a significant
group, withholds consent, important research can be
stifled.
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III.
Thus propertization my be necessary in order to protect
genetic privacy in the event of bankruptcy, but two ad-
ditional components may also be necessary to strike
the appropriate balance. To deal with problems like ad-
hesion, bounded rationality, and information asymme-
try, it may be necessary to police the privacy bargains
struck by patients and information donors. This polic-
ing may take a number of forms. For example, it might
take the form of a sticky default rule, where express con-
sent or specific consideration are required to give effect
to consent. It could also take the form of an inalien-
ability rule, prohibiting blanket consents, and/or even
prohibiting consent to certain uses of genetic informa-
tion. Finally, it could take the form of a standard form
license, where the terms and scope of consent are spec-
ified by law instead of private negotiation. Which of
these forms should be used is beyond the scope of this
article, and will probably vary significantly depending
on context.
44
In addition to policing the bargain to protect indi-
viduals from overreaching or overbroad consents, it
may also be necessary to limit the ability of individuals
to tie up their information, and prohibit its use. The
public interest in gathering information necessary to
protect public health, or to develop effective therapies
may trump the individual's desire to sequester genetic
data. Any such limits on privacy should, of course, be
narrowly tailored to a necessary public purpose, and the
compulsory use of the information should carry with it
privacy safeguards, such as removal of names and other
identifying information.
These comments go, however, to the substance of ge-
netic privacy rather than the remedy for violation, and
this, to a certain extent, is the point. While propertiza-
tion of genetic information may be a solution to the
bankruptcy problem, the scope of the property right,
the extent to which it is alienable, and the extent to
which it is inviolate are all up for grabs. While proper-
tization may be necessary to ensure enforcement of pri-
vacy protections, propertization is neither sufficient,
nor is it possible for it to be absolute. Norm and rem-
edy are inextricably linked in the context of genetic pri-
vacy. The answers to most of these questions are likely
to be context specific. Hard bargains may need to be
softened, and narrow restrictions on information use
may need to be broadened. These questions will in-
evitably need to be answered expost.
In an earlier article, I suggested that any mechanism
for making such expost determinations would need to
comprise a pair of key attributes: (1) mandatory muddy
standardization; and (2) a collective procedure for qui-
eting title.45 Mandatory muddy standardization deals
with the fact that informed consent is not, and cannot
be, about bargaining. The various ways in which tissue
samples and genetic information are, and can be used,
are too complex, too hard to predict, and too hard to de-
scribe, for a short conversation between Patient and
Doctor to produce anything but unfortunate and ran-
dom results. As such, a regime that allowed patients to
specify broad types of use, but which allowed deviations
from those specifications when justified by important
research or therapeutic justifications makes some sense.
The key point is that the source of this rule is unlikely
to be bargained consent. It may take the form of a rule
about deviations from, or limitations on the require-
ment from consent, but the rule itself is not likely to be
bargained for. Moreover, while such rules may, in the
first instance be legislative, or regulated, in order to
work, they will need some play in the joints in order to
allow decisionmakers to handle the variety of circum-
stances that may arise. The collective procedure for
quieting title focuses on the decisionmaker. Since
biobanks will, by definition contain samples from and
information about many individuals, there needs to be
a forum and procedure where multiple issues of consent
and multiple parties can be dealt with simultaneously.
That procedure must allow for representation of pa-
tient's interests, and authoritative decisions about sec-
ondary use.
In my earlier article, I suggested that a flawed, but
promising model is proposed in amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code. That provision, the Leahy Amend-
ment,46 grants the holders of privacy promises a right
to have their privacy expectations "adequately pro-
tected," and provides for the appointment of a "privacy
ombudsmen" charged with negotiating on behalf of,
and representing the interests of the people whose in-
formation is contained in the database.47
The Leahy Amendment has two principal weak-
nesses. First, it defers absolutely to bargained-for pri-
vacy policies where they exist. As such, it is likely to fall
victim to the problems of adhesion, information asym-
metry, bounded rationality and coordination described
above. It also fails to define "adequate protection:."4
These concerns go to substance, rather than remedy. A
procedure like the Leahy Amendment, if properly con-
structed, has the potential both to protect Patient's pri-
vacy and wishes with regard to the use of his genetic in-
formation, and to allow for flexibility over time and in
changed circumstances.
Conclusion
In sum, insolvency has the potential to undercut the en-
forcement of privacy promises made by Biobanks, but
Bankruptcy law may hold promise as a locus for devel-
oping procedures which will provide both appropriate
protection and needed flexibility.
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Appendix
State Genetic Privacy Laws
State and Statute Informed Consent Required to Define as Personal Property
. PersonalAccess ------ , Specific
to Genetic Perform/ Obtain/Access, Retain Disclose Penalties for
Information Require Genetic Genetic Genetic Genetic DNA !Genetic Privacy
Required GeneticTest Information Information Information Information Samples Violations
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona §20-448.02 V V
Arkansas SB764 V_
California Insurance § 10149.1 V
Colorado § 10-3-1 104-7 _/ V _/
Connecticut
Delaware § 16.2.1220 to V V V /
§16.2.1227
Florida §760.40 V V V _/
Georgia §§33-54-I to 8 V _ V V _ _
Hawaii §431 - 10A- 118 _ _
Idaho
Illinois §410-513 V V
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana §22:213.7; V V V
§40:1299.6
Maine
Maryland Ins §27-909 V
Labor & Emp §49B- 15 and 16
Massachusetts I I .70G V/  V
Michigan §333,17020 V
§333.17520
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri 375.1309 VV _ _
Montana
Nebraska §71-I, 104.1 V
Nevada §629, I01 to V V V V V
629.201
New Hampshire § 141 -H:2 _V
New Jersey § 10:5-43 to V V V
§ 10:5-49
New Mexico §24-21-1 to V V V V V V
24-21-7
NewYork CVR §79-L _/ V/ V/ _V
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon §192.531 to V V V V V
192.549; SB 618
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island §27-18-52, V
52.3, §27-19-44, 44. I, §27-
20-39.39. 1, §27-41-53, 53.1
South Carolina §38-93- 10 to V V V
38-93-60
South Dakota SBI /
Tennessee
Texas Vernon's Civil §9031 /
Utah' HB 56 _V
Vermont § 18:9331 to V V 
§18:9335
Virginia §38.2-508.4 V_
Washington2 SB 5207 N/
WestVirginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Total 4 I 1 5 6 25s 4 0 1 17
I, Limits disclosures of and access to genetic information by employers and insurers. 2. Requires written authorization only Source: NCSL
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